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ABSTRACT 
 
Climate change involves human societies in problems of loss: depletion, disappearance, and 
collapse. The climate changes and changes other things, in specifically destructive ways. What 
can and should sociology endeavour to know about this particular form of social change? This 
article outlines the sociology of loss as a project for sociological engagement with climate 
change, one that breaks out of environmental sociology as the conventional silo of research and 
bridges to other subfields. I address four interrelated dimensions of loss that climate change 
presents: the materiality of loss; the politics of loss; knowledge of loss; and practices of loss. 
Unlike “sustainability”—the more dominant framing in the social sciences of climate change—
the sociology of loss examines what does, will, or must disappear rather than what can or should 
be sustained. Though the sociology of loss requires a confrontation with the melancholia of 
suffering people and places, it also speaks to new solidarities and positive transformations. 
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“Now we are in a new epoch, in the new century, the world looks different, and issues of resource depletion, 
contestation and collapse will haunt it — and, more parochially, sociology — in some potentially catastrophic 
decades to come.” – John Urry, 2011 
 
 Policymakers and the public do not look to sociologists for expertise on climate change. 
As is the case with many other pressing societal and global challenges, where social scientists are 
consulted in the production of climate science and policy, they are most often economists 
(Yearley 2009; Szersznyski and Urry 2010). Many sociologists have observed and bemoaned this 
relative marginalization of sociological perspectives, despite the fact that we “have a lot to offer” 
(Bhatasara 2015: 217). Sociologists do indeed produce empirical and theoretical work on climate 
change and on the relations between society and environment more generally. More 
fundamentally, climate change is a problem of how we live, produce, and consume, and the 
science of society ought to be at the forefront of efforts to understand and address such a 
problem. Thus, much energy has gone into demonstrating the need for sociology, collating the 
available insights from this literature to make a persuasive case for sociology’s (along with other 
social sciences’) integration with climate science more generally (Dunlap and Brulle 2015; Zehr 
2015; Castree, et al. 2014; Weaver, et al. 2014; Norgaard 2018). Sociological analyses, it has been 
argued in review articles, task force publications, and books, ought to be incorporated into wider 
research programs.  
 I do not disagree with this mission. However, my agenda in this piece is somewhat 
different. The motivating question here is not “what can sociology contribute to climate 
change,” but rather: “what can climate change contribute to sociology?” The former question is 
essential, but it has been competently and comprehensively addressed elsewhere. The latter 
question needs greater attention. Elizabeth Shove (2010: 280) has also advocated “turn[ing] the 
question around” in this way. For her, doing so prompted an exploration into how climate 
change has affected theoretical development across the social sciences. Climate change, she 
observes, has renewed and recast longstanding social theory debates around the nature–culture 
divide, capitalism, and the social construction of knowledge. Though this has been highly 
generative, “Since there is only so much intellectual energy to go around, these points of 
concentration draw resources away from projects for which readers do not already exist” (285). 
My objective here is to outline a new project that climate change pushes us to take on: the 
sociology of loss.  
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As the John Urry epigraph above suggests, if climate change indeed haunts sociology, it 
is perhaps particularly as a question of depletion, disappearance, and collapse. Rising seas 
swallow islands. In 2016, Australian researchers reported that five Pacific islands had already 
disappeared due to rising seas and erosion, and six others had large swaths of land washed away. 
Nuatambu island, of the Solomon Islands, has lost half of its inhabitable area since 2011 (Albert, 
et al. 2016). Sea levels around the world are projected to rise between one to four feet by the end 
of the century, depending on greenhouse gas emissions (Melillo, et al. 2014). Already observed 
sea level increases have made storm surges higher, exacerbating the destruction of hurricanes in 
the U.S. Increasing temperatures and shifting winds, currents, and precipitation cripple the 
industries that depend on the productivity of land and sea. Farmers in places as different as 
California and sub-Saharan Africa—already afflicted by longer and deeper droughts, diminished 
groundwater supply, and soil degradation—can expect increasingly negative impacts on most 
crops and livestock (Melillo, et al. 2014; Vidal 2013). People—disproportionately the poor—die 
in floods, storms, and heat waves. The World Health Organization estimates that between 2030 
and 2050, climate change will cause approximately 250,000 additional deaths per year, from 
malnutrition, malaria, diarrhoea and heat stress (World Health Organization 2018). The climate 
changes and changes other things, in specifically destructive ways. What can and should 
sociology endeavour to know about this particular form of social change?  
 Though I start with a different formulation of the relation between climate change and 
sociology, the result here is also to identify some ways in which sociology’s insights can be 
extended productively to explain and interpret various facets of climate change. Much of the 
available sociological research on climate change per se has been produced by and discussed 
among environmental sociologists (Brechin 2008). Starting with “what can sociology contribute 
to climate change” implies a first exercise of exegetical organizing within that silo. By approaching 
instead from the angle of what climate change can contribute to sociology, this article seeks to 
bring climate change out of that silo, productive as it has been. Climate change can and should 
provoke many and varied kinds of theorizations for sociologists, across subfields, which can in 
turn work to clarify the stakes and consequences of the threats societies and individuals face. I 
articulate climate change to research concerns and conclusions from other subfields through this 
thematic of loss, in conjunction with thematising loss as it appears in some of the sociological 
research on climate change per se. The hope is that doing so will respond in some way to the 
observed and lamented reticence of ‘mainstream’ sociology to engage climate change (Lever-
Tracy 2008; Grundmann and Stehr 2010; Szersznyski and Urry 2010), which in turn contributes 
to the marginalization of sociology in the wider world of climate change research.  
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Loss is also a provocative riposte to the dominant and more conventional concept that 
frames social scientific study of climate change: sustainability. It adjusts the analytical focus, 
asking about what does, will, or must disappear rather than about what can or should be 
sustained. Loss is a more ambivalent outcome—though, I will argue, does not necessarily imply 
pessimism or catastrophism—where sustainability is often mobilized as an overtly normative 
project of harmony and holism, the identification of “win-wins,” the reproduction of a certain 
kind of status quo, and the voluntarism of enlightened actors. These are framings with different 
moods: where sustainability is sunny, loss is melancholy. Though critiques of sustainability 
abound (Greenberg 2013; Swyngedouw 2010; Checker 2011; Isenhour, McDonogh, and Checker 
2015; among numerous others), deploying sociology and social science more generally on this 
terrain or in these terms occludes certain things from view. By drawing attention to loss, 
sociology can leverage or even celebrate its critical distance from climate change research and 
from the policymaking world it informs. It can highlight contradiction: what is lost so that other 
things can be sustained? And it can imagine more deeply transformative visions: what might take 
the place of what is lost? 
Below, I begin with a discussion of loss generally and its emerging place within climate 
change policy and discourse. I then address four interrelated dimensions of loss that climate 
change presents, with each discussion anchored in different traditions of sociological research: 
the materiality of loss (urban and rural sociology); the politics of loss (political sociology); 
knowledge of loss (economic sociology and the sociology of knowledge); and practices of loss 
(the sociology of consumption). This is, of course, not an exhaustive list. The ambition of the 
intervention is to set out a sort of menu of possibilities, identifying new touch-points between 
the field and climate change, as well as re-reading ongoing conversations through the lens of 
loss. Within each dimension, I have biased my choice of empirical cases and examples toward 
those that are available to us in the present moment. We have always lived in and with a 
changing climate (Clark 2010; Hulme 2009), but now we are experiencing and observing losses 
from the destabilizing boost given to climatic conditions by human activities. Problems of loss 
cannot be analytically or ethically consigned to the future. While sociology ought to contemplate 
the future of human societies vis-à-vis climate change (Urry 2007, 2016), the thematic of loss 
highlights that climate change already offers conditions ripe for the methodological and 
analytical tools of sociological study. Climate change is the present for sociology and to ignore it 
is to ignore the world we currently inhabit.  
 
Loss and its relationship to climate change 
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 For my purposes here, loss involves disappearance, destruction, dispossession, 
depletion—in brief, the transformation of presence to absence. It is both object and process. 
Much of the (relatively limited) sociological interest in loss has examined it at the micro-level, 
situating loss theoretically in the sociology of emotion and the sociology of the self (e.g. Jakoby 
2015; Lofland 1982; Charmaz 1983; Marris 1986). Of particular interest in this literature are 
changes to intimate social relations, e.g. death or divorce, as well as changes to social position 
attendant on events like job loss. Such experiences typically involve some experience of grief and 
trauma; they are an “involuntary severance” (Lofland 1982: 219; Cochran and Claspell 1987; 
Jakoby 2012; Lofland 1985; Fowlkes 1990; Brand 2015). Loss is an unmooring interior 
experience, one that disrupts the stable meanings that frame our lives and that root our senses of 
identity and belonging (Marris 1986). Losses are also, in the context of any life, unavoidable. 
Loss is a multifaceted and “elementary human experience,” as diverse as human bonds 
themselves (Jakoby 2015: 110). However, its reflection in problems of the self and of emotion 
are just a few ways in which “loss and society are closely connected” (Jakoby 2015: 110). In 
contrast to these treatments of loss, in this article I decentre the individual emotional experience 
of loss in order to address other ways in which losses are socially organized. While individual 
experience of loss, and attendant trauma and grief, cuts across the dimensions taken up in this 
article, here I examine how climate change directs attention within a sociology of loss to more 
collective social processes of human settlement, political mobilization, the production of 
knowledge, and practices of consumption.  
 Loss has a quantitative and qualitative character, both of which are implicated in climate 
change. There are losses: having less of something. There is less money at the household level 
when families have to spend more on disaster recovery. There is less money at the national level 
when the productivity of industries declines. There is less biodiversity, fewer species cohabiting 
the planet with us. These are the losses that preoccupy experts’ attempts to measure and model 
as a way to grasp what is or will be quantitatively different in a climate-changed world. Loss also 
encompasses the qualitatively distinct, the disappearance of ways of life, landscapes, places, and 
cultures, which can be memorialized but not recovered, recouped, or compensated (Barnett, et 
al. 2016; Adger, et al. 2011). In either sense, grappling sociologically and politically with loss 
means anticipating and accepting a certain measure of failure, at the level of global action, to 
prevent or avoid some forms of destruction. It does not imply abandoning serious mitigation 
efforts—in the way Jamieson (2005) argues “slouching toward” an adaptation-only policy will—
but it does require conceding and contending with the limitations of mitigation.  
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Climate policy actors are themselves moving in this direction. The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) enacted the Warsaw International 
Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts at the 19th 
Conference of Parties in 2013. The “L&D” mechanism is a new policy paradigm meant to 
encompass both extreme and slow-onset events, with a focus on developing countries that are 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. It concedes that there are limits 
to adaptation, defined by the intersection of climate change and the biophysical and 
socioeconomic constraints of local contexts (Tschakert, et al. 2017). Countries that played the 
smallest role in causing climate change stand to be among the biggest losers. The mechanism 
thus provides a venue for policymakers to negotiate what actions must take place within the 
residual policy gap between climate change adaptation, disaster risk reduction, and available 
public and private risk transfer tools (e.g. insurance) (Wrathall, et al. 2015). How should the rich 
world mobilize resources to address permanent losses of livelihoods and landscapes in poorer 
countries? 
The establishment of the L&D mechanism quickly set off research oriented to solving 
conceptual and operational problems in the definition and attribution of loss (Tschakert, et al. 
2017; Wrathall, et al. 2015), even yielding outlines for a “science of loss” (Barnett, et al. 2016). 
Such epistemological and scientific projects are themselves ripe for sociological examination 
(taken up in more detail below). The sociology of loss, however, takes a broader view, 
untethered from (but potentially informative for) the specific objectives of international climate 
policy. As many of the examples chosen for discussion here will illustrate, the sociology of loss 
illuminates the social and political effects of high-carbon societies, even when such effects are 
not recognized as climate change-related by the actors involved. Climate change also constitutes 
empirical projects for sociology that capture and analyse loss in more affluent contexts. With its 
explicit emphasis on developing countries, the L&D mechanism emphasizes the hierarchical 
character of climate change, but a sociology of loss also attends to its democratic face. As Beck 
(2010) argues, climate change is both. It “exacerbates existing inequalities of poor and rich, 
centre and periphery—but simultaneously dissolves them. The greater the planetary threat, the 
less the possibility that even the wealthiest and most powerful will avoid it” (175). Though the 
distribution of and ability to cope with loss varies in predictable ways, we are all vulnerable to 
loss. The dimensions of a sociology of loss examined here also excavate the generative 
possibilities of loss. As a target of policymaking, L&D treats climate-related loss as something to 
be avoided or minimized. But climate change also pushes us to consider instances or situations 
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of loss that are desired or designed, potentially in pursuit of transformations that are better for 
us, with or without climate change.  
 
The materiality of loss 
 
 The U.S. state of Louisiana is literally disappearing. According to a 2017 U.S. Geological 
Service report, 58 square miles of land have vanished since 2010. Sea-level rise, “projected to 
increase at an exponential rate,” accelerates the rate of wetland loss, as do hurricanes, which may 
become stronger with further climate change (Couvillion, et al. 2017). Coastal landscapes are 
dynamic under any circumstances, but Louisiana residents have watched the marshes disintegrate 
in their lifetimes. In the process, livelihoods and investments collapse, industries shift 
production, and neighbours leave. State agencies work feverishly to build land to offset losses, 
while at the same time policymakers debate unbuilding the coast and relocating residents to 
higher, drier ground. This is not a U.S. Gulf Coast problem; as mentioned above, similar 
processes are unfolding for small Pacific island nations and coastal regions worldwide. This is a 
distinct kind of “loss of place,” one in which communities experience the disappearance of the 
land beneath their feet and, with it, the built and non-human environments that make social life 
possible and predictable. The materiality of loss here refers to disappearances wrought by 
shifting coastlines, denuded forests, storm-wrecked cities, in brief, the fundamentally altered 
ecologies of a place. Along this material dimension, the sociology of loss examines which people 
get stranded or displaced, how, and with what effects; how loss can be designed by social actors 
and institutions; and the contradictions that may arise from abandoning those parcels of land 
which can no longer be defended.  
 However, this kind of “loss of place” is not the most common sense in which sociology 
engages with the concept. Empirically, most sociological research, much of it in urban and rural 
sociology, treats loss of place as the result of social processes of displacement that work to push 
people out of their homes, communities, and lands, at the behest of powerful authorities and/or 
privileged others, e.g. the gentrification of neighbourhoods (Atkinson 2015; Brown-Saracino 
2009; Marcuse 1986), urban renewal (Gans 1962; Logan and Molotch 1987), national and global 
economic shifts (Savage, Bagnall, and Longhurst 2005), or colonial and development-forced 
resettlement (Li 2007). Changes to the built/non-human environment may accompany or follow 
these processes, but they are not mechanisms as such (Norgaard and Reed 2017). The sociology 
of loss can build from work that joins studies of the political economy of urban and rural 
(re)development to the critical social science of disaster, as Gotham and Greenberg (2014) do in 
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their comparative study of New Orleans and New York City. In New Orleans after Hurricane 
Katrina (as in New York City after 9/11), post-crisis processes of uneven redevelopment 
reinforced pre-crisis inequalities, reshaping the built environment in the process. Not only did 
low-income, poor, and marginalized people suffer more from the destruction of homes, 
infrastructure, and landscapes than did the wealthy and well-connected, as many scholars of 
disaster have shown in other cases (e.g. Erikson 1976; Fothergill 2004; Klinenberg 2002; 
Freudenberg, Gramling, and Laska 2009), but also, in the aftermath, New Orleans city elites and 
developers used the crisis to clear wetland ecosystems for residential, commercial, and industrial 
redevelopment while leaving the needs of the most vulnerable largely unmet.  
Gotham and Greenberg (2014) show how material losses (both from the catastrophic 
storm and the recovery) can be situated in the context of longer histories, as well as connected to 
the other socio-spatial processes connected with “loss of place”. Climate change brings new 
valence to such processes, and the sociology of loss also takes within view material changes that 
unfold more gradually, as slower-motion “disasters” than critical disaster studies conventionally 
examines. For instance, “climate gentrification” is now in the public lexicon. Urban planning and 
design researchers have recently begun to connect higher land elevations to long-term price 
appreciation of property in Miami-Dade County, an area vulnerable not only to hurricanes but 
increasingly to routine “nuisance flooding” that keeps land underwater on a more regular basis 
(Kennan, Hill, and Gumber 2018). This, the study’s authors suggest, may work to drive rich 
residents and real estate investors into the higher-elevation areas that have historically been the 
home of lower-income communities. The rich and powerful move to avoid loss and dispossess 
poorer people in the process. The encroachment of water, transformed into an assessment of 
property values and preferences, undoubtedly intersects with the social factors sociologists have 
connected to gentrification, such as historical racial segregation, income and wealth inequality, 
and the spatial distribution of economic activity, but in as yet underspecified ways. Similarly, 
sociologists can study loss of place as a result of the explosion of “resilience” planning in the 
urban governance of cities around the world. A new kind of urban renewal is taking place in 
New York City, for example, where privately owned flood-prone homes are being purchased by 
the city and state so that the lots can be either “returned to nature” (Koslov 2016) or 
redeveloped into more flood-resilient housing (with no right of return for former residents). 
Climate variability and environmental change can lead people to abandon places, in some cases 
forcing displacements that combine with the complex mix of political and economic factors we 
regularly associate with migration (Black, Kniveton, and Schmidt-Verkerk 2011; Tschakert and 
Tutu 2010).  
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Material losses necessarily intersect with a stratified world. As the L&D mechanism 
expressly acknowledges as the normative basis for its existence, the populations most vulnerable 
to desertification, forest degradation, sea level rise, salinization, and biodiversity loss are located 
in some of the world’s poorest countries. A focus on the materiality of loss addresses not only 
this geopolitical stratification, but takes a more analytically precise view to examine within-
country political economies and inequalities, as the above examples also suggest. For instance, 
nearly one in three of the Maldives’ 185 inhabited islands may have to be abandoned, according 
to the country’s housing minister. But in the view of the current government, they need to be 
abandoned only by the ordinary Dhivehins who rely on fishing their local waters—the newly 
“deserted” islands may be handed over to developers to build luxury resorts. Under such a plan, 
the gradual submerging of islands due to climate change will redistribute Dhivehin people across 
the Maldives’ islands, but with its poorest and least-served citizens losing place to tourists from 
richer countries (not to mention driving up the country’s carbon emissions in the process) (Vidal 
2017).  
This example also underscores that to take seriously the materiality of loss attendant on 
climate change is not to regard such losses as unmediated, or to consider what we observe 
ecologically to be somehow really or analytically exogenous to what takes place socially. As many 
have noted, any nature–social divide in social theory has been unproductive at best, delusional at 
worst, belied dramatically by the very notion of an Anthropocene (Latour 2017; Hulme 2010b). 
For a sociology of loss, this requires acknowledgement that, of course, material losses are 
engineered in the first place by the complex interaction of human activity and ecological change. 
But more specifically, the realm of sociologically interesting phenomena related to the materiality 
of loss is not defined only in terms of how individuals and groups respond when land is 
submerged, eroded, burned, or made barren, as the result of “natural” disasters and hazards 
associated with rising sea levels, shifting precipitation patterns, and extreme heat and cold. The 
sociology of loss also addresses how humans actively seek and achieve loss of place through 
planning done in the name of climate change (Beck 2010; Hulme 2009). Projects of transformation 
undertaken to mitigate or adapt to climate change encourage or compel the abandonment of 
places and/or the movement of people away from them (de Sherbinin, et al. 2011; Farbotko 
2010). This enacts a particular temporality of loss in which the abandonment, sacrifice, or 
destruction of places, buildings, and livelihoods takes place today in order to pre-empt future 
losses framed as the result of inevitable, naturalized, catastrophic change. Kasia Paprocki (2018a) 
calls this “anticipatory ruination”: “a discursive and material process of social and ecological 
destruction in anticipation of real or perceived threats.” In her study, the district of Khulna in 
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coastal Bangladesh, framed as a “zone of climate crisis” by local and global actors, becomes a 
site where shrimp aquaculture displaces rice cultivation as more “viable” in the context of 
ostensibly inevitable climate change, dispossessing farmers, salinating the soil, and killing other 
vegetation in the process. A sociology of loss also endeavours to know how waterfronts, 
landmasses, cities, and villages become active sites of destructive transformation, with potentially 
unintended, contradictory, and unequal consequences. Framed in terms of sociological 
preoccupations, the materiality of loss is thus analytically important in both realist and 
constructionist understandings of climate change, transcending a tension that has stymied 
sociological engagement (Antonio and Clark 2015; Bhatasara 2015; Demeritt 2001; Urry 2011). 
In other words, the observed effects we call “climate change” physically transform our world (as 
in Willox, et al. 2013), as does climate change as “a resourceful idea and a versatile explanation,” 
a set of moral and causal narratives that mobilize and justify certain kinds of physical changes for 
mitigation and/or adaptation (Hulme 2010a: 267). Climate changes become real “only as they are 
integrated into the discursive formations rooted in power relations, competing knowledge 
systems, and a contentious distribution of wealth and resources” (Marino and Ribot 2012: 325). 
Climate change’s connection to loss of place can also recast normative treatments of 
these transformations and their consequences. Our instinct is to understand loss as bad, a 
product not only of our emotional register for personal loss, as an individual experience, but also 
of the numerous studies we have of communities’ or particular social groups’ violent and 
unwanted dispossession, destruction, and displacement. In sociology, loss of place figures largely 
as a kind of trauma, a disruption that is unevenly experienced as it burdens the socially 
marginalized more frequently and intensely. “The loss of place,” Gieryn (2000) concludes, “must 
have devastating implications” (482). Across sites and seemingly regardless of the underlying 
causes, researchers have found that the loss of place disrupts individual and collective identity, 
social networks, and emotional bonds. This is true too in the burgeoning environmental 
psychology literature on “place attachment” and climate change (see Devine-Wright 2013 for a 
summary). The environmental philosopher Glenn Albrecht has coined the term “solastalgia” to 
describe the melancholy of seeing a beloved home environment undergo negative 
transformations: “the homesickness you have when you are still at home” (Albrecht 2012). Loss 
may indeed always be a hard experience because change is hard, but in the context of climate 
change not every loss is traumatic and not every loss of place is met defensively. In Liz Koslov’s 
ethnography of “managed retreat” on Staten Island, New York in the wake of Hurricane Sandy, 
she shows that local residents organized for their own community’s dispersal. After repeated 
storms and flooding, these Staten Islanders mobilized to unbuild their neighbourhoods, pushing 
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the governor of New York to implement and expand a buyout program that would purchase and 
demolish homes, with the promise that new structures would not be built in these hazardous 
areas. This flew in the face of the municipal government’s own plans to rebuild bigger and better 
in other parts of the city, aligned with a more typically American refusal to capitulate in the face 
of catastrophe (Dawson 2017; Steinberg 2006). Though they faced loss, the Staten Island buyout 
groups made meaning out of the experience in which they were empowered and responsible. 
Though they were ambivalent about calling this “climate change adaptation”, retreating residents 
felt they were the agents who would finally and prudently undo the “costly and destructive 
mistake” of building on the wetlands in the first place (Koslov 2016: 375). They would be doing 
a greater service to their “forgotten borough” by taking on the challenges of relocating, as the 
restored wetlands would provide more natural protection from future floods for those residents 
who remained. The effects of climate change invite us to re-examine how place may be lost—or 
sacrificed—to protect or promote other cherished things and ideals. Keeping vulnerable people 
in vulnerable places seems like a cycle worth breaking. As livelihoods in certain places become 
less tenable, choices of what to preserve and what to let go, for whom and when, are less 
normatively straightforward and more ambivalent in their consequences, capable of making 
people feel both more and less secure (Elliott 2018; Tschakert, et al. 2017). These choices are 
also, of course, fundamentally political, and it is to the politics of loss that we must turn to next. 
 
The politics of loss 
 
 The thematic of loss orients sociology to new sites for examining climate politics. The 
“climate politics” on which publics and scholars largely focus are self-consciously about climate 
change: the Paris Agreement, the policy paradigms coming out of the UNFCCC, projects of 
urban climate governance, divestment campaigns, climate marches, climate justice movements, 
and the like. But as Daniel Aldana Cohen (2017, 2018) argues, climate change stretches across 
many domains of political contestation, bound up with fights over inequality in particular. For 
instance, decarbonizing cities requires changes to the existing (carbon-intensive) arrangements of 
housing, transit, and land use that have worked to produce social exclusion and urban inequality. 
Struggles over the “right to the city” are, in Cohen’s rendering, struggles over the ecological fates 
of cities; housing politics are climate politics. The strategic implication is therefore “to find ways 
to combine the priorities of environmental and housing-oriented movements” (Cohen 2018: 3). 
There is much to be gained, not only for populations that have experienced oppressive social 
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and spatial marginalization, but for all of us who benefit from lower-emission, more sustainable 
cities.  
 Yet there is also a dimension of loss to these politics, a story about the loss of economic 
rents and returns on investment, the loss of perquisites and privileges that accrue not only to the 
elites and powerful industries that benefit from commodified housing, but also to the property-
owning middle and working classes. I take Cohen’s provocation to identify climate politics and 
climate publics in other arenas of social policymaking, but here sketch out how climate change 
intersects with sociological work on the more reactive and defensive politics associated with 
these kinds of losses, as a way to bridge with research traditions in political sociology. We can 
ask questions about the kinds of politics losses produce, for instance: what constituencies and 
coalitions, discourses and claims, are created when land disappears or property values in risky 
areas collapse? Whose losses are made to matter and how? How are social contracts tested and 
potentially reconfigured, through changes to public policy, in order to manage rising losses?   
The domain of natural hazards risk and insurance provides an illustrative case for 
examining the politics of loss. In the United States, millions of families living in flood- and 
hurricane-prone areas face losses on the most important asset they will ever own: their home. 
For some, this is connected to an actual catastrophe, to the winds and water that wreck their 
property. For many others, however, this loss takes the form of a threat to their property values, 
transmitted by the insurance arrangements that make homeownership possible and affordable 
(Flavelle 2018). As hazards change and intensify, risk-reflexive insurance institutions reassess 
their underlying risks and work to “price in” that changing assessment into actuarially derived 
premiums. Yearly costs go up; the property values in these riskier areas go down; residents worry 
about the resale value of their homes and, therefore, their retirement and future economic 
security. Local officials worry about the viability of the tax base. In the U.S., this has set in 
motion a reactive politics around defending property investments, with coalitions of 
homeowners, real estate and construction interests, local officials, and chambers of commerce 
mobilizing to blunt the force of insurance-led devaluations of hazardous areas (Elliott 2017b; 
Weinkle and Pielke, Jr. 2017; Checker 2017; Ubert 2017). In the specific case of flood insurance, 
which is publicly provided through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and run by 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), when Congress authorized the NFIP to 
remove longstanding subsidies and discounts and increase the cost of flood insurance so that 
premiums would cover expected losses—justified in part as a way to equip the program to adapt 
to climate change—a national, grassroots network of homeowners called “Stop FEMA Now” 
led a backlash that ultimately pushed legislators to backtrack on these changes. This newly 
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constituted political entity made politically potent claims about insurance effectively destroying 
the wealth they had worked hard to build, regulating their communities out of existence even if 
floodwaters never came. They claimed that the individual losses they faced, and the aggregate 
losses that had generated episodic, taxpayer-funded bailouts of the programme, were not their 
fault but rather the fault of decades of mismanagement of the NFIP itself. As climate impacts 
are economized by insurance, changing the costs and (financial, but also social and emotional) 
values associated with property, we can expect to see new iterations of battles familiar to political 
sociology, in the U.S. and other national contexts: over the role of the state in protecting 
investments (Becher 2014), the limits of public versus private risk bearing (Moss 2004; Krieger 
and Demeritt 2015; Calhoun 2006), issues of solidarity and fairness in insurance (Lehtonen and 
Liukko 2015; Elliott 2017b; Mabbett 2014), and government protection from the market (Martin 
2008). And as a result, the politics of loss may generate innovations in property, investment, and 
housing policy regimes. 
The idea of a “climate public” has an almost naturalistic sensibility to it; climate change 
will create constituencies by imperilling people in locally specific ways. People will realize or 
anticipate loss and they will be activated to engage politically to address climate change as the 
cause of that loss. But Stop FEMA Now is a different kind of “climate public.” It is not self-
consciously organized as such and it does not make claims about mitigating or adapting to 
climate change. Instead, it is a kind of “accidental” climate public—not because, as in Cohen’s 
(2017) case of São Paulo housing activists, it pursues a low-carbon vision of change, but rather in 
the sense that it is a constituency created by the public policies and economic arrangements that 
transmit changing hazards into daily life and the governance of it. This is a politics of those who 
have something to lose due to climate change, and their activism is ecologically decisive for 
whether or how radically (carbon-intensive) arrangements of housing and property can change. 
Examples like Stop FEMA Now complicate expectations of what “climate publics” are and do, 
putting a different spin on the “enforced cosmopolitanism” of climate change described by 
Ulrich Beck. In Beck’s imagining, the global scope of climate change activates and connects 
actors across borders, compelling “communication between those who do not want to have 
anything to do with one another” (2006: 339). In its more provincial way, Stop FEMA Now did 
just that, connecting homeowners across political party, class, and region. However, this was not 
in pursuit of the coordinated climate politics implicit in Beck’s treatment. Stop FEMA Now did 
not make common cause with other populations whose economic security or “survival chances” 
could be compromised (Beck 2010: 175). Instead, it made a more limited and reactive set of 
claims to contest the financial arrangements that price, manage, and compensate loss. 
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The constitution of new collectivities and constituencies around loss is one form of the 
path-dependent “policy feedbacks” that are relevant to how the politics of loss unfold (Weir, 
Orloff, and Skocpol 1988; Mettler and Soss 2004; Hacker and Pierson 2014). The NFIP, like 
other examples of public policy, has significant political effects on social actors: “on who they 
are, on what they want, on how and with whom they organize” (Pierson 2006: 116). Stop FEMA 
Now organized members not principally as floodplain homeowners, but rather as flood zone 
homeowners. Their claims were not focused on their vulnerability to flooding, a vulnerability 
that is expected to increase due to climate change. Instead, their claims were based on their 
designation as residents in official flood zones, areas identified and mapped for the purposes of 
public policy, areas which made them subject to certain kinds of requirements and regulations. 
They did not exist independently of the public policy for flood risk management; they needed 
the flood map with its high- and low-risk boundaries to recognize their shared exposure to loss. 
Insurance, along with infrastructure policy, housing policy, disaster relief, and other public 
policies have participated in the construction of a landscape of property ownership in vulnerable 
areas, creating in the process a sort of incumbent resident interested in defending longstanding 
privileges, whose life and livelihood was shaped by particular “rules of the game” (Pierson 2006: 
116) in a political and cultural context that deems the market as the most rational way to allocate 
and manage housing. Though these rules are starting to appear to some stakeholders as 
inadequate for living in a time of climate change, they have produced a “legislative status quo” 
that resists change.  
This is, of course, not only a U.S. dilemma. Every polity will experience some version of 
this, a problem of “stable policy rules interact[ing] with an unstable world” (Hacker and Pierson 
2014: 647). Political sociology can explain how programmes are cut or reconfigured, eligibility 
expanded or curtailed, benefits enhanced or diminished, in ways that directly shape how 
individuals and communities will fare in a climate-changed world. Who will lose what and when 
depends on the outcome of struggles in these terrains. Welfare state scholars have observed the 
problem of a growing “mismatch” between traditional social policies and the new social risks 
that citizens face, characterized by Esping-Andersen as a “disjuncture between the existing 
institutional configuration and exogenous change” (1999: 5). Contemporary welfare states were 
constructed for “a society that no longer obtains” (Esping-Andersen 1999: 5; also Giddens 
1999). In this research, the focal changes are long-term transformations in the global economy 
that have increased economic insecurity, with welfare states failing to keep up and, in some 
policy areas, retrenching from broad social protection. The result has been an accelerating 
process of “risk privatization” in which social policies “come to cover a declining portion of the 
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salient risks faced by citizens” (Hacker 2004: 244; also Hacker and O’Leary 2012; Hacker 2006). 
Climate change too represents a source of new and changing risks facing citizens, reanimating 
these same questions about the viability of the social contract embedded in welfare states and 
about inequalities in how well-served people are by its policies. Economic losses represent a 
direct strain; natural disasters consume larger portions of national and subnational budgets, 
exceeding in many cases the terms and capacities of private risk transfer arrangements and 
siphoning resources from other areas of social provision. These losses, as well as policies to 
minimize or avoid them, have a distributional character in terms of risks and benefits, affecting 
different regions, economic sectors, and people differently (Gough and Meadowcroft 2010).  
This is all to say that the category of “climate policy” is populated by not only emissions 
regulations, building codes and energy efficiency and transition policy, but also by the broader 
array of public policies that shape how people live and work. These policies, with the 
constituencies, preferences, and channels of influence they have created, will be key sites at 
which the politics of loss unfold and the social conditions of a climate-changed future are 
determined. Will governments come to the aid of farmers in regions where changing 
precipitation patterns compromise agricultural production? Will residents be compensated for 
the costs of adjusting settlements in vulnerable coastal areas? Will the state provide support to 
workers who lose jobs in industrial sectors that are declining as a result of climate policy? Which 
of these losses become areas of intervention and which do not? Will collective risk-sharing 
arrangements continue to shrink such that individuals and families are left to bear more of these 
losses on their own?  
The answers to these questions will be determined in part by the success or failure of 
claims of moral worthiness. As Dauber (2013) notes in the context of U.S. disaster politics, the 
ability to represent a loss as blameless enhances claims on collective resources. With climate-
related losses, designations of “deservingness” will shape whose losses warrant relief and whose 
requests are rejected, just as they have in the context of other social policy debates. But the 
global nature of the threat expands the reach of these moralized debates beyond national 
borders, exposing a tension in welfare states: “that in delivering entitlements to citizens they 
discriminate against non-citizens and ‘denizens’ and can become ‘fortress’ welfare systems” 
(Gough and Meadowcroft 2010: 493). The “climate refugee” is the rhetorical figure mobilized by 
global environmental organizations, development institutions, military and security experts, and 
political elites to describe both current and future migrants fleeing already poor places made 
uninhabitable by drought, flood, and extreme weather. These are climate change’s “losers,” 
displaced from home and turning up at the borders of richer countries, where they run into the 
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thorny politics of borders, race, national security, and welfare provision—politics that 
sociologists have long been studying. In December 2017, New Zealand created a special visa for 
Pacific Island residents forced to migrate because of rising sea levels. Politics in the U.S. and 
Europe are trending in a far less inclusive and generous direction. Underpinning these claims and 
their outcomes are social processes of adjudicating what counts as a loss, what value we ascribe 
to loss, whether loss can be attributed to climate change specifically, and who, if anyone, can be 
held responsible—in brief, processes of assembling knowledge of loss.  
 
Knowledge of loss 
 
 Loss participates in a more general problem of knowledge that undergirds much social 
action vis-à-vis climate change: the problem of attribution (Huggel, et al. 2013; Hulme 2014). 
Climate change, both climate scientists and sociologists are aware, is a bundle of many alterations 
that are related to one another in complex and unevenly understood ways. Forging a connection 
between “climate change” and observed changes (a few inches of sea level rise, a shift in average 
temperatures) or single events (a catastrophic flood, a hurricane of unprecedented strength) is a 
scientific and discursive achievement. There is an abundance of data about various features of 
our ecological and biophysical conditions, an “excess of objectivity,” which can be assembled in 
different, reasonable ways to “yield competing views of the ‘problem’ and of how society should 
respond” (Sarewitz 2004: 389; Webb 2011; Weinkle and Pielke, Jr. 2017). Interpretations of the 
relationship between climate change and different observed shifts, discrete catastrophes, and 
assessed risks inevitably vary and often conflict. In this context, whether, or how much of, a loss 
can be identified as the result of “climate change” is itself at stake, a matter that may appear 
more or less settled depending on prevailing conditions and is tied to the kinds of claims 
implicated actors can then make. This is a familiar kind of puzzle for sociologists of knowledge 
and science studies scholars, who can do much to clarify how losses are defined, measured, and 
attributed through the interaction of experts, technology, and legal and policy institutions, 
working in particular historical and cultural contexts. A focus on loss refocuses and advances the 
conversation on knowledge production and climate change. It shifts the question from one of 
the social production (and contestation) of authoritative facts about climate change’s very 
existence or anthropogenic character to one of knowing its effects. The challenge for science and 
other social institutions is not only one of revealing “invisible, elusive, fearful, yet wholly ‘real’ 
entities” (Jasanoff 2010: 235), like carbon emissions, but also of recognizing, characterizing, and 
attributing the observable.  
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 Losses of land and livelihood are often revealed and become matters of concern in crisis, 
when ways of life are overwhelmed by catastrophic events, e.g. when a hurricane lays waste to a 
Caribbean island, or by the cumulative effects of more gradual changes, like desertification and 
sea level rise. In both cases, whatever extremes are introduced by climate change intersect with 
the historical production of particular landscapes of vulnerability, in which many different 
powerful actors and forces are implicated. To return to the example of Louisiana, for instance, 
the dissolution of the marshland may dramatize sea level rise, but it is also attributable to 
centuries of human engineering that have changed the way water moves through the ecosystem. 
Levee construction on the Mississippi river has long prevented silt deposits from spring floods, 
contributing to erosion. The growth and development of the oil and gas industry in the state, in 
particular, has subjected the coastal plain to “a massive and still growing matrix of oil and gas 
canals, pipelines, spoil banks, and associated industrial development and social–ecological 
reorganization” (Gotham 2016: 212). As early as the 1970s, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
had connected this extraction infrastructure to irretrievable marshland loss (Houck 2015). All 
over the world, societies have been reengineering their “natural” landscapes, hardening 
shorelines and redirecting water in ways that have, in turn, made certain exposures to loss 
possible (Steinberg 2006, 2014). The losses facing many poorer countries are a combined 
product of climate change and processes of colonisation and development (O’Brien and 
Leichenko 2000; Paprocki 2018b).  
The task of sociology is not to adjudicate how much of a loss is “really” climate change, 
or whether people on the move are “really” climate refugees (as opposed to refugees from 
something else), but rather to investigate how social actors identify evidence of loss, and 
temporally and spatially delimit loss, in pursuit of different objectives and claims. This takes 
place in a variety of sites, including the media, policymaking arenas at multiple scales, and courts 
of law, and can work to either elevate or diminish the purported role of climate change. For 
example, in 2013, the South Louisiana Flood Protection and Levee Authority filed suit against 97 
oil and gas companies for damages to the landscape below New Orleans and compensation for 
its restoration, igniting a heated conflict between the Authority and the pro-industry governor of 
the state. Attribution for loss was the central stake in this battle, in both the courts and in the 
public eye. Though the fossil fuel industry has played a central role in climate change and hence 
the ecological changes impacting the coast, writ large, the success of the Authority’s claim rested 
on the extent to which it could convince a judge that Louisiana’s specific losses were the result of 
the actions of those specific 97 companies (an earlier, more ambitious lawsuit blaming Katrina 
losses on the oil and gas industry had failed by not proving exactly whose canals were at fault) 
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(Houck 2015). The vice president of the Authority told the Times-Picayune newspaper: “We are 
looking to the industry to fix the part of the problem that they created… We’re not asking them 
to fix everything. We only want them to address the part of the problem that they created.” The 
industry representative responded: “The reasons for the loss are complex and involve both 
natural changes and many man-made activities” (quoted in Schleifstein 2013). Establishing this 
knowledge of loss would require adjudicating the work of field biologists to correlate canal 
density and land loss, of geologists to connect subsidence to hydrocarbon production, and of 
lawyers to determine who knew what and when they knew it. In this case, the Authority’s 
strategy was to avoid attribution to “climate change” per se, as this would implicate too many 
actors to hold any one of them completely or largely responsible. But the pursuit of 
compensation for loss was made in part as a project of climate change adaptation; any awarded 
settlement would go to fund future storm surge protection. In other cases, by contrast, cities and 
U.S. counties have sued oil and gas companies seeking compensation explicitly for climate 
change losses, arguing that these companies knew the science of global warming, predicted its 
consequences, and then funded massive campaigns of misinformation. These cases and their 
outcomes socially construct loss as a legal concept, with actors drawing conflicting connections 
and boundaries between specific losses, climate change, and other contributing factors.  
These legal cases reveal that the stakes of attribution are high because the outcome 
specifies particular relations of responsibility. How losses are classified vis-à-vis climate change 
has significant implications for who is expected to do what about those losses. In the case of 
climate refugees, for instance, describing specific mass movements of people as driven by 
climate change implies the involvement of a globally dispersed set of actors in both causing and 
responding to those movements. The Syrian conflict, or the Arab Spring, transforms from a 
political conflict related to long simmering desperation and anger at existing regimes to social 
paroxysms unleashed by a series of droughts, land degradation, food insecurity, and water 
scarcity, with people ultimately fleeing as much the latter as the former (Selby, et al. 2017). 
Recent “migrant crises” in Europe have provided the terrain to contemplate how worsening 
climate conditions might drive further waves of migration in the decades to come (Missirian and 
Schenkler 2017). The World Bank and other international organizations talk about “climate 
refugees” to bolster calls for global commitment to addressing climate change: mitigate its worst 
effects and fewer people will be forced from their communities and into others. Outside actors 
may not have the diplomatic will or capability to intervene in domestic or regional political 
conflicts, but if such conflicts are fundamentally related to climate change, they can play a role in 
stemming that. 
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Knowledge of loss is also produced through processes of valuation taking place in 
venues like the UNFCCC, which are currently developing conceptual and operational tools for 
attributing and economizing climate-related losses, as introduced above. Some climate 
researchers note that though the UNFCCC loss and damage mechanism recognizes the 
relevance of “noneconomic” losses (Fankheuser, Dietz, and Gradwell 2014), its orientation 
toward addressing problems of cost means that it “risks commodifying incommensurable values, 
and ignoring those that cannot be costed, thereby undermining meaningful practices for recovery 
and renewal” (Tschakert, et al. 2017: 3). There is a “hostile worlds” danger here (Zelizer 2005), 
where economic techniques of quantification that “may be appropriate for stocks and flows of 
commodities,” when applied to certain things, conflate price and value in ways that suppress, or 
even distort, their real importance in human relations (Wrathall, et al. 2015: 282). Money 
payments cannot address, much less make good, certain losses; they are morally or ethically 
incompatible with market relations (O’Neill and Spash 2000). For these observers, part of the 
problem with the L&D is thus that, if dominated by economic techniques, it will “normatively 
suggest that environmental, personal and cultural goods and services can be subsumed into a 
liberal conception of property rights, with rights of exclusivity and alienability” (Wrathall, et al. 
2015: 282). Nevertheless, as economic sociologists have examined across an array of empirical 
sites, we routinely commensurate the intangible and inalienable (Fourcade 2011; Healy 2006; 
Almeling 2007; Zelizer 1979, 2005; MacKenzie 2009). In brief, “Treading carefully around the 
ethical qualms of the societies they serve, modern social institutions spend considerable time and 
effort measuring what seems unmeasurable and valuing what seems beyond valuation in the 
service of enhancing their own capacities for calculation, crafting new opportunities for profit, or 
expanding their jurisdictional authority” (Fourcade 2011: 1723). Part of the agenda of a sociology 
of loss is therefore not to parse “incommensurable” goods, values, and states of affairs from the 
development and application of economic techniques, but rather to examine how moral and 
political commitments, along with other registers of worth and value, shape these very social 
processes.  
Furthermore, even those valuation processes that do focus on assets and resources (the 
more conventional objects of commensuration and monetization), situated in the “safer domain 
of one-off economic impacts” (Wrathall, et al. 2015: 279), warrant sociological attention 
(Demeritt and Rothman 1999). For instance, the field focused most squarely on economically 
valuing loss—insurance—makes climate change a particular kind of matter of concern for other 
actors: “it objectifies and commodifies climate change as an uncertain phenomenon, yet presents 
it as manageable, at least to an extent” (Lehtonen 2017: 33). The industry has developed 
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catastrophe models to estimate “what-if” loss scenarios related to natural hazard events. 
Insurers, regulators, and policymakers view these estimations of loss as essential for pricing 
natural hazards insurance in an “actuarially fair” way, i.e. pricing premiums so that they reflect 
the “true” or “real” risk. But arriving at such estimations requires modellers to make a number of 
different choices—based on the values, judgments, and objectives of the decision-maker—
regarding whether and how to use different kinds of data, how to delimit relevant time frames, 
and which assumptions to operationalize (Ericson and Doyle 2004; Wynne 1992). As Weinkle 
and Pielke, Jr. (2017) show, in the case of Florida hurricane modelling and rate-making, 
“decision-making about hurricane risk is not straightforward and requires resting on beliefs 
about applicable theory, relevant data, what has happened in the past, and what the future will 
look like” (561). And small adjustments at the level of the model can have huge implications if 
they manifest as higher insurance costs to policyholders, creating further political problems for 
local officials who then hear complaints from their constituents, as the example of Stop FEMA 
Now above demonstrates. When competing catastrophe modelling companies presented their 
estimations of hurricane loss to Florida’s insurance regulators for use in the state’s Public Model, 
the standard-setting authority assessed the options in light of their political and economic 
implications. When it rejected methodologies that were not “scientifically sound,” it prompted 
one vendor to create a new, “improved” version—that had, unsurprisingly, reduced views of 
hurricane risk.  
This is not a story about the fabrication of numbers and science to serve political ends, 
which sounds dangerously similar to the arguments made by fossil fuel lobbies and the climate 
sceptics they fund. Such moves have arguably discouraged sociologists and other critical social 
scientists, who advance arguments about the social construction of facts, from engaging more 
directly with climate change (Latour 2004; Grundmann, et al. 2012). Rather, this is a story of 
competing characterizations of loss, each its own kind of truth based on credible assemblages of 
data, assumptions, and techniques. Weinkle and Pielke, Jr. (2017) indeed demonstrate that model 
output “reflects the noise of politics as usual and researchers scrambling to explain an uncertain 
world,” but not in order to discredit the scientific enterprise as a way to assemble knowledge of 
loss altogether. Rather, they build from this demonstration a critique of the pride-of-place given 
to model outputs in decision-making. The models are treated as though they can advise precisely 
on day-to-day business decisions related to insurance rates or capital requirements, but they 
cannot offer that kind of precision. In a context in which we have to imagine, and feel compelled 
to somehow plan for and manage, the “blunt impacts of loss on society and the economy,” 
catastrophe models act as a “modern proxy for traditional human exchange about personal fears 
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and social wants” (Weinkle and Pielke, Jr. 2017: 566) The challenge, Weinkle and Pielke, Jr. point 
out, is about “how best to manage a loss large enough to destabilize society” and models cannot 
settle upon a single true estimate of that risk. Robust decision-making in such a context may 
require a broader set of tools, that are more democratically distributed, than those provided by 
technocratic faith in risk experts (Jasanoff 2010; Wynne 2010).  
A sociology of loss can trace the “feedback loop from monetary valuation to social 
representations and practices” (Fourcade 2011: 1728), which reshape the physical and social 
world in a time of climate change. Our ways of knowing and valuing extant and future losses 
shape decisions we take about what to protect and how, where investments in infrastructure are 
needed and their scale, and who can, should, or must take responsibility for compensating or 
avoiding losses. Whether or not it is “economically rational” to respond aggressively to climate 
change, for instance, depends on the discount rate, a matter of tremendous dispute among 
leaders in the field of climate change economics (see Jamieson 2014 for a summary). Knowledge 
of loss constitutes our sense of what to do and how to do it—in other words, it informs 
practices of loss.  
 
Practices of loss 
 
As the previous sections have shown, loss is something that is both reacted to and 
actively produced, both materially real and socially constructed and mediated. It can also be both 
lamented and necessary, painful or awkward while at the same time unavoidable and even 
ultimately rewarding. This ambivalence of loss, and perhaps its most radical implications, are 
evident when we consider practices of loss, which for my purposes pertain to how 
environmentally destructive ways of producing, living, and consuming are broken and dispensed 
with. The intensity of our resource use and the sheer magnitude of our waste—albeit unevenly 
generated and distributed—pose an existential threat. Consumer capitalism, with its growth 
imperative and attendant high carbon systems, has seemingly locked in certain trajectories of 
human behaviour that are hard to dismantle or reverse (Urry 2011). Yet certain things must be 
surrendered rather than sustained, and a focus on the sociology of loss brings to the fore 
unanswered questions about processes of “defection”: how people reject or abandon certain 
practices, particularly those to which they are habituated (Shove 2010). While we know a great 
deal more about habituation and the formation of tastes, practices of loss instead emphasize the 
“unmaking of unsustainability” (Shove 2010: 282), in which processes of recruitment and 
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innovation co-exist, and do not necessarily unfold symmetrically, with processes of 
“disappearance, partial continuity and resurrection” (Shove 2012: 363).  
Recent turns in the sociology of consumption provide analytical tools for undertaking 
new investigations of such defections. Though consumption is always an environmental act 
(Hawkins 2012), research on “sustainable consumption” often focuses more narrowly on the 
symbolic dimensions of conspicuously “green” products and services, emphasizing the 
connections between consumption and taste, status distinction, and identity formation and 
communication (Elliott 2013; Cairns, et al. 2014; Barendregt and Jaffe 2014). But the areas of 
consumption that most directly affect carbon emissions are housing, transport, and food (Dietz, 
et al. 2009), which bear a more ambiguous relationship to the forms of display, deliberation, 
meaning, social signalling, and individual (though socially patterned) choice that have 
preoccupied much research (Warde 2015). How we wash our bodies, clothes, and living spaces; 
how we stock our fridges, where our food travels from, and when we throw it away; how we 
heat and cool our homes and workplaces; how we get to and from place to place—these are all 
practices that must change, specifically in ways that mitigate their environmental effects (Shove 
2003; Shove, Walker, and Brown 2014; Shove, Pantzer, and Watson 2012; Evans 2011; 
Southerton 2013). As such, the sociology of consumption, particularly that which is informed by 
practice theory (Schatzki, Cetina, and von Savigny 2001), has begun to focus more squarely on 
the use of goods and resources rather than on their selection; on routine, mundane activities 
rather than on projects of self-presentation; and on material elements rather than on image and 
meaning (Warde 2014, 2015; Elliott 2017a). Many of the practices of consumption that need to 
be lost are ones we may not typically recognize as consumption in our daily lives. For instance, as 
I write, I sit in an office with a radiator that, despite my best efforts, I cannot control. When it 
continues to spew heat into my office even after the weather has warmed, I have to open a 
window if I want to keep the ambient temperature to below-sauna levels, knowing as I do so that 
I am haemorrhaging energy from this already old and leaky academic building. I can make a 
choice here, but it is strongly framed by the material elements of the building, making this a 
problem of both individual and collective consumption.  
This reframing thus also confronts the voluntarist overtones of research and discourses 
of sustainable consumption, with their frequent emphasis on developing pro-environmental 
attitudes that presumably will lead “sovereign consumers” to make different choices (for 
summary and critique, see Southerton, Chappells, and Van Vliet 2004). The practice approach in 
sociology, in the context of consumption, emphasizes instead the “socially conditioned actor, a 
social self, embedded in normative and institutional contexts and considered a bearer of 
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practices” (Warde 2015: 129; Shove and Spurling 2013). In an example from Shove (2003), the 
definition of showering daily as a “normal practice”—when the shower itself has been a 
relatively stable technology and the practice typically goes unobserved by others—expresses 
“converging conventions” of comfort, cleanliness, and convenience, which can escalate and 
standardize in ways that have significant environmental impacts (see also Urry 2010). We engage 
in this routine out of an operative notion of an “appropriately showered” body that has emerged 
through historical processes of normalisation. It is these normative and institutional contexts 
that become potential activators of practices of loss, where defections from environmentally 
destructive practices come not at the behest of self-possessed and environmentally conscious 
individual agents, but rather from the changing availability and cultural significance of different 
conveniences and aspirations.  
 How we consume is related to how we work, another new terrain for practices of loss. 
Countries with longer working hours consume more resources and emit more carbon. More 
work means larger scales of production means higher emissions. More work also means more 
spending; we buy rather than make, and the things we buy, in the rich world, tend to be carbon-
intensive goods and services. We acquire and discard at an alarming pace. In the U.S., the most 
disproportionately high-energy producing and consuming country, per-capita spending grew 42 
percent overall from 1990-2008, with a 300 percent increase in spending on furniture, an 80 
percent increase on clothing, and a 15-20 percent increase on vehicles, housing, and food—
despite nearly stagnant wages over the time period (Schor 2010). But more generally, across the 
OECD, net of GDP, the more we work, the larger our ecological footprint (Knight, Rosa, and 
Schor 2013). Growth (at least in rich countries) apparently fuels emissions, one logical 
implication therefore being that we ought to work less and move toward a steady-state economy 
(Jackson 2009; D’Alisa, Kallis, and Demaria 2014) or post-/non-capitalist society (Goldstein  
2018; Sklair 2017), in order to lose the practices of working to earn and earning to consume (as 
well as to distribute working time more evenly across the population and to enable a better 
balance between paid and unpaid work like caregiving) (Gough and Meadowcroft 2010). This 
will mean aspiring to have less—less money and less stuff—and the loss of culture-ideologies 
that tie ambition and success to material affluence.  
Here, though, is a way in which loss makes way for something better, at least if the 
proponents of “degrowth” and “downshifting” have it right. In their view, this is not really a 
sacrifice, or at least not a sacrifice of anything worth holding onto. Consumption-centred lives, 
financed largely on credit and lived in busyness-glorifying cultures, have made most in the rich 
world unhappy: time-pressed, socially isolated, and stressed out (Schor 2010; Wajcman 2015). 
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Shorter work hours, spread more evenly, however, allow people the time to build and nurture 
social connections, maintain their health, and engage in creative activities (Malleson 2015; Schor 
2010; Gunderson 2018). Cohen (2014) offers a vision of “low-carbon leisure”: “socializing in 
public space, using our time to do interesting things in energetic ways. That includes sports, 
picnics, and lounging in parks, learning in schools and libraries.” The demise of resource-
intensive practices can yield a new, different, and more equally accessible version of the good 
life.  
Climate change demands some measure of imagination from sociological projects on 
practices of loss. Such projects envision alternative economic and cultural practices (which can 
sometimes be the recovery of previously lost practices, e.g. mass cycling over automobile 
commuting, Shove 2012). The pursuit of “positive model[s] of a low-carbon future” (Giddens 
2011: 24) requires a resolute orientation to the future directions of societies—an orientation 
from which much of contemporary sociology has demurred (Lever-Tracy 2008). Yet there are 
historical and emergent empirical avenues from which to launch such visions. For low-carbon 
leisure, Cohen (2014) looks to workers’ mobilizations in interwar France, which elected a 
government that pursued “a massive program to democratize regional leisure for the masses,” 
legislating paid vacation, providing train discounts, and funding theatres and popular 
productions in partnership with unions. Malleson (2015) cites the Dutch, who have legislated 
work-reduction and work flexibility, maintaining economic security through social programs that 
are delinked from employment. In an edited volume, Schor and Thompson (2014) collect case 
studies from around the world—Chicago, the Aude region of France, Lithuania—in which 
people are engaging in practices of “plenitude”: working and spending less, connecting and 
creating more. Across these cases, groups of people organized in order to break the reproduction 
of certain work and consumption practices, with ecologically significant effects.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 In this article, I have outlined the sociology of loss as a new project for theoretical and 
empirical engagement with climate change. The sociology of loss examines an essential 
dimension of what human societies have to cope with in a climate-changed world. Places are 
destroyed and disappear. Political and economic privileges attendant on a destabilized status quo 
are eroded. Losses are accounted for and managed. Environmentally destructive practices must 
end. Climate change does not drive loss in a deterministic fashion; as the examples above 
demonstrate, the work of individuals, groups, communities, powerful interests, and institutions 
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shapes the course of loss, producing divergent outcomes in terms of who loses what, when, how 
much, and with what results, at multiple geographic scales. I have situated the dimensions of loss 
addressed here in different corners of the discipline, but they are of course empirically 
interrelated, often in ways that connect spatially dispersed actors in the context of particular 
episodes of loss. For example, the 2017 hurricanes season devastated several Caribbean island 
nations, as well as Puerto Rico and other parts of the southeast U.S. Thousands died and many 
islands have been depopulated, abandoned by some portion of their residents. Assessing the 
economic losses involved the work of reinsurers located in European capitals. At the United 
Nations General Assembly, governance actors made and discussed attribution claims that 
connected the disasters and their losses to climate change and to the practices of the rich world; 
in the view of the Prime Minister of Antigua and Barbuda: “Climate change is real. We are the 
victims of climate change because of the profligacy in the use of fossil fuels by the large 
industrialized nations” (quoted in Brown 2017). Climate change losses unfold in a relational and 
often antagonistic space—indeed, the notion of “losers” implies one of “winners.” These are not 
terms in which sustainability discourse is comfortable speaking and, relative to that discourse, the 
sociology of loss provides an anti-whiggish way to examine the ongoing transformations we face. 
What a sociology of loss loses, perhaps, is an orientation to climate change that starts from the 
reassurance that things are or will be OK.  
What does climate change bring to sociology? I am not suggesting here that climate 
change is “only” about loss, nor that more obvious empirical topics related to climate change—
the Kyoto Protocol, the COP meetings, denialism, political economies of energy, climate 
movements—are somehow beside the point. Instead, the ambition of this piece was one of 
generative bridging and extension. I have outlined a number of ways that sociology, across a 
variety of subfields, can gain purchase on major changes that are already being visited upon 
individuals, families, communities, cities, and countries. There is a fundamentally environmental 
character to such changes, but the theoretical resources we need to understand them come from 
areas of the field that are not always occupied with environmental topics or trained on the 
environment–society relation: urban, rural, political, and economic sociology, the sociology of 
knowledge and of consumption, and undoubtedly other subfields. As an analytical frame, the 
sociology of loss also has the advantage of allowing research to address climate change without 
having to theorize “climate change” as such. Theorizing climate change is a crucially important 
task in which some sociology is engaged, but it is not the only point of entry. Climate change is, 
after all, not one type of thing or effect, implying that an empirically and analytically rigorous 
approach can address itself to spatially and historically specific impacts. Loss is one way to 
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address those impacts, to examine what climate change looks like when it hits the ground. In 
other words, it focuses more on what climate change does than on what climate change “is” (or 
isn’t). A focus on loss in some sense demystifies climate change, not only bringing it out of the 
realm of “inaccessible upper atmospheres, ancient ice cores or deep oceans, where no social facts 
exist” (Lever-Tracy 2008: 454), but also providing a path to building sociological understanding 
of climate change in ways that can reflect on nature–culture, or on capitalism, without getting 
mired in social theory’s ambivalence on these topics (Antonio and Clark 2015).   
While loss provides leverage on the specificities of climate change, it also speaks to the 
general and universal, and the possibilities thereof. Here is where loss can shed its pessimism.  
Loss is an unavoidable human experience under any conditions. We are always vulnerable to 
loss. Climate change research, within and beyond sociology, has problematized vulnerability, 
focusing in particular on redress of its uneven distributions along lines of gender, race, class, and 
region. But as Nigel Clark (2010) observes, vulnerability is also constitutive of our humanness: 
“As fleshy, sensuous creatures, we have always been exposed to the energy and the inertia, the 
flow and the congealing, the mobilization and the halting of the earth” (13; also Hulme 2010b). 
For Clark, this suggests an approach that “work[s] with and through our vulnerabilities, rather 
than trying to find a way around them” (2010: 13). The planet will surprise us. Despite our best 
efforts to control it, even the “least” vulnerable face losses they cannot anticipate or avoid. 
Discourse and policy dedicated to finding a way to deal with climate change may stall on the 
stubborn interests of opposing actors, or competing imaginaries of an uncertain future, but we 
all know what it is to lose. Some do and will lose more frequently and profoundly than others, 
but the shared experience of loss is something that empathically connects humans—we often 
respond with sensitivity and generosity to the losses of others. For Clark, this is reason to be 
hopeful: 
 
“But there is a kind of faith that there already exists a vast reservoir of experience – 
inscribed in communities, bodies, landscapes, stories, objects – about how to make it 
across the inconstancies that belong to the earth itself. And an equally hopeful sense that 
there are, taking place at any moment, a great many acts of care and support for those 
who have been struck by forces beyond their tolerance. An intimation that, along with all 
the dispute and contestation so prized by critical thinkers, there are also deep, ordinary 
and extraordinary dispositions of generosity to others coursing through everyday social 
life” (2010: 19). 
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A sociology of loss can attend not only to social difference as it intersects with loss, but also to 
social solidarities that do or could spring from the openness of people to others who turn to 
them in times of loss. These solidarities are not purely aspirational; they are empirically emergent. 
In the wake of the devastation from Hurricane Maria, and the subsequent malign neglect of 
Puerto Rico by the Trump administration, collective actions took place in Oakland, California, 
Miami, Florida, and Washington, D.C. The Miami event was evocatively named “We are in the 
Same Boat.”  
This openness—to others and to a volatile world—is also what makes humans adaptable. 
It makes us capable of living with the loss of things, places, people, and ways of life we treasure, 
and capable of losing in order to transform, to be “remade into something other than what we 
are” (Clark 2010: 18). It makes us capable of living with “recreated climates,” of giving them 
“meaning, value, and utility” (Hulme 2010b: 120-121). Simply avoiding loss so as to sustain what 
we have—“we” being those of us living privileged lives in privileged places—may miss more 
transformative opportunities. Societies can respond to the losses facing homeowners, for 
instance, with generous outlays of resources to help them rebuild “back to normal”. Or they can 
change the commodity form of land itself, interfering with the rights of private property in order 
to provide equitable access to housing that is safer and more secure from climate change’s 
impacts (Davis 2014). If we cannot begin from the premise that things will be OK, we are 
pushed to these more radical places. We will lose but, as Goldstein (2018) urges, we can also “let 
go and learn to love other worlds” (170).   
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